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CPLR 3101(e): Plaintiff entitled to obtain a copy of defendants'
state~nent when incorporated by reference in his own statement.
Under CPLR 3101(e), a party may obtain his own state-
ments without the burden of shoWing or proving those special cir-
cumstances 147 required by prior case law.1 48
In Masone v. Paull,"9 defendants' insurer obtained a written
statement from the plaintiff. Within his "statement, the plaintiff
stated that he had read the defendants' statements and agreed witif
them. In considering plaintiff's motion to'compel defendants to
furnish her, copies of their statements, the court noted that ordi-
narily these statements would be considered material -prepared for
litigation and, thus, conditionally privileged from disclosure under
CPLR 3101 (d) (2).
In granting plaintiff's motion, the court held that a party is
entitled to a copy of his complete statement. In this -instance,
plaintiff was entitled to a copy of defendants' statements since they
were incorporated by reference in his statement.
Thus, CPLR 3101(e) creates another exception to the rule of
CPLR 3101(d) that material prepared for litigation is not dis-
coverable.
CPLR 3106(b): Subpoena must be served to obtain deposition
from agent or non-party witness.
Under prior law, a party to an action desiring to take a deposi-
tion was only required to give reasonable notice to his adversary or
to the adversary's attorney. 5 CPLR 3106(b) now provides that
when the person to be examined is a non-party witness, agent, or
prior holder of a claim, he must be served with a subpoena before
the examination.
In Spector v. Antenna & Radome Research Associates Corp.,151
plaintiff, seeking to examine an independent accountant retained
by defendant, served a notice to take the accountant's deposition
on defendant's counsel. He did not, however, serve a subpoena
on the accountant. The appellate division held that the clear lan-
1473 WEiNSTEiN, KORN & Mn.Tm, Naw Yomx Civu PRAcrcz 113101.56
(1965).
148 E.g., Sacks v. Greyhound Corp., 18 App. Div. 2d 747, 235 N.Y.S.2d
669 (3d Dep't 1962) ; Palmer v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins, Co., 36 Misc. 2d 325,
232 N.Y.S2d 439 (Sup. Ct Steuben County 1962). See CPA § 324.
14948 Misc. 2d 939, 266 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1965).
15o CPA § 290. See also RCP 121-a which limited the taking of testimony
by deposition upon notice to parties in an action, their agents or employees.
Witnesses are not within the purview of such section. Augenblick v.
Augenblick, 203 Misc. 360, 117 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1952).
15125 App. Div. 2d 569, 267 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1966).
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guage of CPLR 3106(b) required the subpoena to be served,
whether the accountant was determined to be the defendant's agent
or a non-party witness, since by such service an agent or non-
party witness is given an opportunity to avail himself of his right
to move for a CPLR 3103 protective order.
It is now clear that the practitioner is required to comply with
the literal language of the statute in serving the subpoena as a
condition precedent to an examination of a non-party witness or
agent.
CPLR 3126: Penalties imposed for -non-compliance with an order
to disclose.
CPLR 3126 imposes harsh penalties for failure to comply with
a disclosure order1 52  The harshness of these penalties has made
the courts reluctant to apply them. In Nomako v. Ashton,'5 3 the
court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer and,
instead, entered an order of dismissal, conditional upon non-com-
pliance with the disclosure order, and compelled payment of plain-
tiff's court costs and attorney's fees. Thus, the court avoided
applying the more severe penalties imposed by CPLR 3126.
Cases subsequent to Nomako have seemingly approved of the
action taken by the first department. They have exercised judicial
restraint in applying the direct sanctions authorized under CPLR
3126.154 For example, in DiBartolo v. American & Foreign Ins.
Co.,'15 where the plaintiff failed to appear on an adjourned date,
the court refused to dismiss the complaint unconditionally. The
order did provide that if costs and counsel fees were paid within
twenty days and if the plaintiff appeared within a specified time,
the motion to dismiss would not be granted. Noting the recent
trend toward ordering this type of punishment for willful non-
disclosure, the court reasoned that the action, though harsh, was
justified because:
W]e cannot altogether condone irresponsible action (or inaction) to
the detriment of a party properly attempting to bring an action through
disclosure to trial and the ultimate resolution of the issues involved 56
' 
2 Vith regard to failure to disclose the court may issue such orders
as are just. This includes, but is not limited to, orders: (1) resolving the
issue to which the information sought is relevant; (2) prohibiting the
disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses;
(3) striking out pleadings or parts thereof; (4) staying proceedings; (5)
dismissing the action; (6) rendering a default judgment against the dis-
obedient party.
153 22 App. Div. 2d 683, 253 N.Y.S2d 309 (1st Dep't 1964).
154See 7B McKwNNEVs CPLR 3126, supp, commentary 76, 79 (1965).
25548 Misc. 2d 843, 265 N.Y.S2d 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1966).
2- Id. at 844, 265 N.Y.S2d at 983.
